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I. INTRODUCTION
The right to decide without government interference whether and
when to have children does not seem at all controversial when preg-
nancy prevention is the issue.1 However, when there is a "potential
life" at stake, the relationship between the right to decide and the
right of the government to intrude becomes far more emotional and
complex. "Potential life" or "personhood" is somewhat arbitrarily de-
fined. Depending on one's religious or philosophic views, life may be.
gin anywhere from conception to implantation to "quickening" to vi-
ability to survivability to birth.2 In a recent poll of Florida voters, the
pollsters came to this conclusion:
* Sole Practitioner, Tallahassee, Fla. B.A., Florida Atlantic University, 1973; J.D.,
Florida State University School of Law, 1977; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center,
1982. The author is a Florida lawyer practicing in the area of state constitutional rights. In
1989 she was one of two lead attorneys prevailing in In re TW, 543 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1989).
She was also Legislative Counsel for the ACLU of Florida from 1987 through 1994.
1. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that a state
statute proscribing the use of contraceptives violated married couples' right to privacy im-
plied in the Bill of Rights); Eisenstadt v.. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (holding that a
state statute proscribing the use of contraceptives violated unmarried individuals' privacy
rights).
2. See generally Keeler v. Superior Ct., 470 P.2d 617, 628 (Cal. 1970) (holding that
the defendant could not be charged for the murder of an unborn fetus pursuant to the state
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Pro-life voters see all life as a priori and the need to protect it self-
evident. Pro-choice voters, on the other hand, see it not in black
and white terms, but in many shades of gray. For these voters, not
all life is necessarily meaningful and sacred. In the end, the debate
over abortion is not about the rights of a woman versus the rights
of the unborn, but the definition of life itself.3
The Florida Supreme Court has consistently ruled in tort cases
that there is no "person" with any rights, standing, or entitlement to
any damages until there is a live birth.4 Although inapplicable to
laws criminalizing involuntary abortion or abortion after viability,
5
this principle has been upheld as applied to criminal laws6 with only
one exception.
7
statute because the Legislature did not intend to include unborn fetuses in the definition of
"human being," but intended "human being' to have the common law meaning of a person
born alive); Jones v. Commonwealth, 830 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Ky. 1992) (holding that the de-
fendant can be charged for the murder of a baby if the injuries causing death were inflicted
to the fetus prior to the birth and the baby was born alive); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,
596 (Tenn. 1992) (finding that frozen embryos, in a custody dispute, are not human beings
but should be afforded more respect than human tissue because of the embryos' potential
to become human beings).
3. The Abortion Attitude Paradox, FLORIDA VOTER (Austin Forman Center for Politi-
cal Studies, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), June-July 1997, at 1, 2.
4. See, e.g., Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 1997) (finding expectant par-
ents cannot prevail on a wrongful death claim because a fetus is not a person, but holding
expectant parents can prevail on a claim for the emotional suffering inflicted by the birth
of the stillborn fetus due to the doctor's negligence).
5. See State v. Ashley, 670 So. 2d 1087, 1089 (Fla. 2d DCA), reh'g granted, 678 So. 2d
339 (Fla. 1996), quashed in part, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S682 (Fla. Oct. 30, 1997). Ashley in-
volved a woman who could not afford to pay for an abortion. At the beginning of her third
trimester of pregnancy and after weeks of unsuccessfully attempting to raise the necessary
money, she shot herself in the abdomen "to hurt the baby." A Caesarean section was per-
formed. There was a live birth. The bullet had passed through the wrist of the fetus. The
infant lived for 15 days and died as a result of multi-organ problems caused by premature
birth and not by the bullet wound. See id. at 1088.
The state charged Ashley with manslaughter, under section 782.07, Florida Statutes,
and with felony murder under section 782.04(4), Florida Statutes. The latter charge was
based on committing the felony of performing an illegal abortion on herself, contrary to
section 390.001(10)(a), Florida Statutes. Section 390.001(10)(a) makes it a third degree fel-
ony for anyone other than a physician to perform an abortion. In an interlocutory appeal,
the court threw out the illegal abortion charge and upheld the simple manslaughter charge
because the infant was born alive and then died indirectly due to Ashley's actions. See id.
at 1093.
The Florida Supreme Court held the state cannot prosecute Ashley for either murder or
manslaughter because the statute failed to explicitly trump the long-standing common law
that holds a woman who self-inflicts injuries while pregnant cannot be criminally liable for
the death of her fetus if it dies after birth. See State v. Ashley, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S682,
S683 (Fla. Oct. 30, 1997). Moreover, the court concluded that the Legislature had not evi-
denced an intent to "pit woman against fetus in criminal court." Id. at S683.
6. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1292 (Fla. 1992).
7. The willful killing of an unborn "quick" child by an injury to the mother is man-
slaughter if the injury was inflicted in such a way as would have made it murder if the in-
jury caused the mother's death. See FLA. STAT. § 782.09 (1997); see also Williams v. State,
15 So. 760, 760 (1894) (affirming the defendant's manslaughter conviction for beating his
pregnant wife with a club, causing the premature birth of her baby, who subsequently died
[Vol. 25:273
REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY RIGHTS
Although the Florida Legislature entered the debate, its focus has
not been on the definition of life itself. Rather, the Legislature has
sought to impose procedural requirements on doctors performing
abortions," to restrict insurance coverage for abortions, 9 and to ban
certain types of abortions. 0 However, prior to 1997, none of the Leg-
islature's attempts to modify a woman's right to an abortion had
been successful. Up until the 1997 Regular Session, the Florida Leg-
islature had not passed a bill placing restrictions on abortion for
nearly a decade." In 1997, the Woman's Right-To-Know Act became
law. 12 The Act requires that women seeking to terminate a pregnancy
in Florida be provided with oral and printed information about spe-
cific aspects of pregnancy, abortion, and childbirth prior to the abor-
tion procedure. 3 Physicians who violate the Act are subject to profes-
sional discipline, including license revocation. 14 The Act has been
temporarily enjoined, and the injunction is being appealed by the
state.8
Part II of this Article discusses the protections afforded women
seeking an abortion under the U.S. Constitution, while Part III ex-
amines protections under the Florida Constitution. Part IV provides
a constitutional analysis of the three bills restricting abortion that
were considered by the 1997 Florida Legislature, most significantly
The Woman's-Right-To-Know Act. Finally, Part V concludes that the
restrictions in place prior to the passage of The Woman's-Right-To-
Know Act maintained an appropriate balance between the pregnant
woman's life and health and the life and health of the fetus.
due to the battery). Although criminal charges have been filed under circumstances where
a fetus has died as a result of a criminal act toward the pregnant woman, appellate review
of the statute's constitutionality has been prevented because the state has charged the
perpetrator under a different, inapplicable statutory section, the injury was followed by a
live birth prior to the infant's death, or some other condition was not met that prevented
challenging the validity of the statute on appeal. See, e.g., Knighton v. State, 603 So. 2d 71,
72 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (affirming a third-degree murder charge because the defendant
shot a bullet into the head of a viable fetus who, although born alive, died as a direct result
of the gunshot wound).
8. See, e.g., Fla. HB 1205 (1997) (Woman's Right-To-Know Act).
9. See Fla. SB 2304 (1997) (Employee Health Care Access Act).
10. See Fla. CS for HB 1227 (1997) (Abortion Method Ban Bill).
11. In 1988, the Parental Consent Abortion Law was enacted. See Act effective Oct. 1,
1988, ch. 88-97, § 6, 1988 Fla. Laws 460, 462-63 (amending FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a)
(1987)) (requiring physicians performing abortions on minors to obtain the written consent
of the minor's parent, custodian, or legal guardian or permitting the physician to rely on a
judicial order).
12. See Act effective July 1, 1997, ch. 97-151, 1997 Fla. Laws 2501 (amending FLA.
STAT. ch. 390 (1995 & Supp. 1996)).
13. See FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(3) (1997).
14. See id. § 390.0111(3)(c).
15. See Presidential Women's Ctr. v. State, No. 97-5796 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. July 2,
1997) (order granting preliminary injunction), appeal docketed, No. 97-2557 (4th DCA filed
July 24, 1997).
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II. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS AS APPLIED TO ABORTION
UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
In Roe v. Wade,'6 the United States Supreme Court struggled with
the issue of determining at what point a state can constitutionally
prevent a pregnant woman from terminating a "potential life."'7 The
Roe Court defined fundamental reproductive privacy rights and the
scope of the state's authority to regulate those rights.'8 The Court de-
cided the word "person" did not include the unborn 9 and established
a trimester framework as a paradigm to balance the pregnant
woman's privacy interests with the state's interests in the health of
the mother and the potential life of the fetus. 0
Pursuant to Roe, the state's important and legitimate interest in
the health of the mother becomes compelling at approximately the
end of the first trimester.21 During this stage, the doctor and patient
are permitted to decide, without state interference, whether or not to
terminate a pregnancy. 2 They may act on that decision free of gov-
ernment restrictions. 23 After this stage, the state can regulate abor-
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. See id. Prior to Roe, the Court upheld a provision of the District of Columbia Code
criminalizing abortion because it "[did] not outlaw all abortions, but only those that are not
performed under the direction of a competent, licensed physician, and those not necessary
to preserve the mother's life or health." United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971).
The decision expressly defined "health" as including all aspects of a woman's physical and
mental health. See id. at 72.
18. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or,
as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose
upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Spe-
cific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be in-
volved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a dis-
tressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all
concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of
bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to
care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and con-
tinuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the
woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.
Id. at 153.
19. See id. at 158.
20. See id. at 164. But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (re-
treating from the strict trimester framework as an overly rigid paradigm for protecting a
woman's right to choose to have an abortion).
21. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 ("With respect to the State's important and legitimate in-
terest in the health of the mother, the 'compelling' point, in the light of present medical
knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester."). Based on medical knowl-
edge, the Court explained that mortality rates in abortion can be less than mortality rates
in normal childbirth. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
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tion as long as the restrictions are reasonably related to the "preser-
vation and protection of maternal health."24
At some point, generally at the beginning of the third trimester,
viability of the fetus becomes an issue. This is because the fetus can
presumably have a "meaningful life outside of the mother's womb."25
Thus, after viability, the state can implement restrictions on abortion
that extend as far as prohibition of the procedure.2 6 However, the
state may not impose restrictions on therapeutic abortions when the
mother's life or health is at stake, even after viability.
27
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 8 the U.S. Supreme Court re-
treated from the strict trimester framework.2 9 The plurality held that
restrictions that do not impose an "undue burden" on abortion are
permissible and that states can express a preference for childbirth
over abortion in their laws.3 0 In response, state legislatures have at-
tempted to impose, sometimes successfully, numerous restrictions on
abortions to make them more difficult to obtain than other medical
procedures.3' Courts strike down these laws when they clearly re-
strict abortions throughout the pregnancy that are necessary to pre-
serve the life or health of the pregnant woman. 2 Courts have also
struck down laws that restrict abortions prior to viability, when the
restriction does not promote maternal health or confficts with
women's privacy rights to make their own decisions about whether
and when to have children.33 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 163-64.
27. See id.
28. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
29. See id. at 876 (holding that the state can regulate abortion as long as it does not
place a substantial burden on a woman's ability to have an abortion prior to viability).
30. See id. at 878.
31. See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d. 1452, 1460, 1463 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding unconstitutional parental notification provisions, a criminal penalty provision,
and a civil penalty provision of a South Dakota abortion statute), cert. denied sub nom,
Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 116 S. Ct. 1582 (1996); Fargo Women's Med. Org. v. Scha-
fer, 18 F.3d 526, 533-35 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding the constitutionality of informed con-
sent provisions, a 24-hour waiting period, and the definition of "medical emergency" in a
North Dakota abortion statute).
32. See Women's Med. Profl Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1060 (S.D. Ohio
1995), affd, Nos. 96-3157, 96-3159, 1997 WL 713520, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 1997) (hold-
ing unconstitutional an Ohio statute that only permitted post-viability abortions to be per-
formed to prevent the pregnant woman's death or injury to a major bodily function, but not
for abortions performed to preserve the pregnant woman's general health); Evans v. Kelly,
1997 WL 471906 at *37 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 1997) (enjoining a Michigan statute that
banned partial birth abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Woods, No. 97-385, (D. Ariz. Oct. 24,
1997) (enjoining an Arizona statute criminalizing partial birth abortion).
33. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 893-94 (striking down a Pennsylvania spousal consent re-
quirement in abortion procedures); Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1113
(5th Cir. 1997) (holding unconstitutional a Louisiana parental consent law because it did
not impose specific time limits for judicial bypass proceedings and failed to require that
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approved carefully crafted state laws that require a brief waiting pe-
riod prior to obtaining an abortion, detailed informed consent proce-
dures, and parental consent for minors' abortions.14 The Supreme
Court has also approved a federal prohibition on the use of Medicaid
funds to reimburse indigents for the costs of abortions" and a statu-
tory ban on the use of public employees and facilities for abortions
not performed to save the life of the pregnant woman.36 However, the
Court has not retreated from the holding in Roe that states cannot
restrict abortion after viability when continuing a pregnancy would
endanger the mother's health or life,37 or prior to viability when the
restriction is'not reasonably related to maternal health.
38
III. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS AS APPLIED TO ABORTION
UNDER THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
"Itihe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people."3 9 The Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution provides, "[tihe enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people. ' '40 Thus, under the Tenth Amendment, state constitutions
may contain a wide variety of provisions that will be deemed valid as
long as they do not exceed the few restrictions the U.S. Constitution
imposes on the exercise of governmental powers. 4' The Ninth
Amendment makes it clear that citizens' rights are not limited to the
ones defined and specifically included in the U.S. Constitution. 42
judges must authorize abortions for minors who were found to be mature or when an abor-
tion would be in the minors' best interest).
34. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887, 899.
35. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324 (1980).
36. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989).
37. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872, 880 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)).
38. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 77-79 (1976) (striking down a
Missouri statute that banned saline induction abortions after the first 12 weeks of preg-
nancy), partially overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (overrul-
ing the holding that provisions of an abortion law requiring informed consent and a 24-
hour waiting period were unconstitutional).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
40. Id. amend. IX.
41. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (holding that a
state may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property in a state constitution if the
restrictions do not violate the U.S. Constitution); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 800 (1995) (holding that states cannot impose additional qualifications required
for candidates to serve in the U.S. Congress than are already established in the U.S. Con-
stitution); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (holding that Congress can ex-
clude from interstate commerce goods that have been manufactured in a way that damages
citizens' welfare).
42. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 998.
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The U.S. Supreme Court clarified that, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, states are not permitted to infringe or violate the indi-
vidual rights of citizens established under the U.S. Constitution. 43 In
combination with the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, this require-
ment provides the foundation for the principle that states may not
provide lesser or fewer protections of the individual rights already
identified in the federal Constitution, but state constitutions are
clearly authorized to provide additional rights or greater protections
of federal rights.44
In In re T. W, 4 the Florida Supreme Court explained this princi-
ple:
The Court, however, has made it clear that the states, not the fed-
eral government, are the final guarantors of personal privacy: "But
the protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be
let alone by other people-is, like the protection of his property
and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual
States.""
Thus, article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, the "privacy
amendment," extends more protection to individual privacy interests
than does the federal Constitution.4 7
The difference in force and function between state and federal
protection of rights addresses the impropriety of relying on U.S. Su-
preme Court cases, such as Casey, as the ultimate and binding
authority to follow when determining whether state abortion restric-
tions meet state constitutional requirements. The U.S. Supreme
Court's interpretation of the extent to which a state is prohibited
from interfering with, infringing upon, or violating similar federal
43. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
44. See Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 81; Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 1992)
(explaining that courts must first evaluate whether the admission of the defendant's con-
fession as evidence violated the state constitution before evaluating whether it violated the
federal Constitution); William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Indi.
vidual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977); Rachel E. Fugate, Comment, The Florida
Constitution: Still Champion of Citizens'Rights?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 87 (1997).
45. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
46. See id. at 1191 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)) (footnotes
omitted).
47. See id.
Since the people of this state exercised their prerogative and enacted an
amendment to the Florida Constitution which expressly and succinctly pro-
vides for a strong right of privacy not found in the United States Constitution,
it can only be concluded that the right is much broader in scope than that of the
Federal Constitution.
Id. at 1191-92 (quoting Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla.
1985)).
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constitutional rights is merely a base line beneath which no state
may fall.'5
Therefore, as long as the state's protections do not fall below those
afforded by the U.S. Constitution, the standard applied when testing
whether an individual's state constitutional rights have been violated
is the standard established by that state's supreme court.49 The
Florida Supreme Court has long rejected restricting the protection of
individuals' state constitutional rights only to the same degree of
protection provided by their federal counterparts. 0 For example,
twenty-five years ago, just before Roe was decided, in a case success-
fully challenging Florida's statute making it a felony for doctors to
perform abortions except where necessary to protect the pregnant
woman's life, the Florida Supreme Court noted that:
"State courts are not bound to follow a decision of a federal court,
even the United States Supreme Court, dealing with state law.
Thus a state court is not bound to follow a decision of a federal
court, even the United States Supreme Court, construing the con-
stitution or a statute of that state."51
Despite the clear message that Florida's constitutional protection of
privacy rights related to abortion is even stronger than the protection
provided by the federal Constitution, the Florida Legislature at-
tempted to restrict these rights by enacting a new law in 1988 re-
quiring parental consent or a court order for minors' abortions.52
A. In re T.W. and the Parental Consent Law
Florida's Parental Consent Law went into effect on October 1,
1988.53 It was temporarily enjoined by the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida on October 6, 1988, because it
failed to provide procedural protections for minors seeking to use the
law's judicial consent bypass.r4 The Florida Supreme Court promul-
gated rules pursuant to the Parental Consent Law in order to ensure
that the judicial bypass proceedings were conducted confidentially
48. See Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 962 ('In any given state, the federal Constitution thus
represents the floor for basic freedoms; the state constitution, the ceiling.") (citation omit-
ted).
49. See id.
50. See State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 435 (Fla. 1972). But see State v. Owen, 696
So. 2d 715, 720 (Fla. 1997) (holding that the Florida Constitution does not impose greater
restrictions on law enforcement than those required by the U.S. Constitution).
51. Barquet, 262 So. 2d at 435 (quoting 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 225 (1964)).
52. See FLA STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (Supp. 1988), repealed by Act effective May 30,
1991, ch. 91-223, § 6, 1991 Fla. Laws 2166.
53. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1988, ch. 88-97, § 6, 1988 Fla. Laws 460, 462-63 (amend-
ing FIA STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (1987)).
54. See Jacksonville Clergy Consultation Serv., Inc. v. Martinez, 696 F. Supp. 1445,
1448 (M.D. Fla. 1988), order dissolved, 707 F. Supp. 1301, 1304 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
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and expeditiously.55 Thereafter, the district court granted the state's
motion to dissolve the injunction on February 13, 1989.56 The Plain-
tiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, but by then the law was in ef-
fect.
In 1989, a minor in central Florida petitioned the circuit court for
an order allowing her to have an abortion without her parent's con-
sent.5 1 Within forty-eight hours, the court found the law unconstitu-
tionally vague and the young woman too immature to consent.58 De-
spite holding the consent requirement unconstitutional, the judge re-
fused to grant an order allowing her to proceed with the abortion
without obtaining parental consent.5 9 On May 12, 1989, the Fifth
District Court of Appeal vacated the circuit court's order, allowing
the minor to proceed with the abortion." The Florida Supreme Court
granted a stay of the Fifth District's mandate again postponing the
abortion, but vacated the stay four days later. The court set In re
T. W. for oral argument in September 1989 to determine the constitu-
tionality of the parental consent law.6 ' Only a few hours after the
Florida Supreme Court dissolved the stay, U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy issued an order, once again blocking the young
woman's ability to have an abortion.62 The U.S. Supreme Court set
aside Justice Kennedy's order the following day.63 This paved the way
for the young woman to finally have the abortion. 4
At the same time, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 5 was
pending in the U.S. Supreme Court. One of the issues addressed in
Webster was whether or not a state could constitutionally declare
that life begins at conception.6 6 New appointments to the U.S. Su-
preme Court led people to believe the courts would be more conserva-
55. See In re Emergency Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure, 536 So. 2d 198, 198 (Fla. 1988); FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a)(3) (Supp.
1988) ('The Supreme Court may promulgate any rules it considers necessary to ensure
that proceedings brought pursuant to this paragraph are handled expeditiously and are
kept confidential.").
56. See Jacksonville Clergy, 707 F. Supp. at 1304.
57. See In re T.W., 543 So. 2d 837, 838 (Fla. 5th DCA), affid, 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla.
1989).
58. See id. at 841.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 842.
61. See Stephen Koff, Justice Kennedy Says No to Florida Teen's Abortion, ST. PETE.
TIMES, May 17, 1989, at Al.
62. See id.
63. See Ruth Marcus, Court Clears Way for Teen-Ager's Abortion, WASH. POST, May
19, 1989, atA7.
64. See id.
65. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
66. See id. at 506.
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tive on this issue7.6 Abortion opponents touted Webster as the case
that would overturn Roe.68
Florida's anti-abortion Governor, Robert Martinez, was more than
ready to take advantage of this possible good fortune. Following the
close of the 1989 Regular Session and prior to the Webster decision,
Governor Martinez called a special legislative session for mid-
October to consider implementing additional restrictions on abor-
tion.69 While the decision in In re T. W. was pending and after Gover-
nor Martinez called for the special session, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Webster.
B. The Effect of Webster on In re T.W.
The Webster decision disappointed both supporters and opponents
of abortion rights.70 Although the Court in Webster allowed Missouri
to make the statement that life begins at conception, the Court pro-
hibited the state from making abortion illegal.7 The plurality deci-
sion retreated from the trimester framework established in Roe by
upholding a Missouri statute requiring physicians to determine
whether a fetus is viable prior to performing an abortion if the physi-
cian suspects the woman to be twenty weeks pregnant or more.7
However, the plurality in Webster failed to clearly articulate what
standard would replace the trimester framework.7 3
All of the briefs had been filed and the oral argument had been
held in In re T.W. before the Webster decision was issued. As a result,
the Florida Supreme Court ordered all parties to submit supplemen-
tal briefs on the effect of Webster on In re T.W. and Florida abortion
67. Justice Antonin Scalia, a conservative, was appointed to the court by President
Ronald Reagan in 1986 to replace the seat left vacant by the resignation of Warren E. Bur-
ger. See Ruth Marcus, Rehnquist, Scalia Take Their Oaths; Reagan Lauds Burger at Re-
tirement, WASH. POST, June 19, 1986, at A14. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, a moderate
conservative, was appointed by Ronald Reagan to replace the seat vacated by Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. See Al Kamen, Kennedy Confirmed, 97.0; Senate Approves Supreme Court
Nomination, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1988, at Al.
68. See Andrea Sachs, Abortion on the Ropes: Is the Historic Roe v. Wade Ruling
About to Be Overturned?, TIME, Dec. 1988, at 58.
69. See Proclamation of Governor Martinez (July 25, 1989) (available at Fla. Dep't of
State, Div. of Archives, ser. 13, carton 40, Tallahassee, Fla.); see also Tim Nickens, Capitol
Set for Abortion Throng, ST. PETE. TIMES, July 28, 1989, at B6.
70. See Robert Post, Webster's Chaotic Aftermath, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1989, § 2, at 7
(detailing the negative impact the decision could have on the pro-choice movement); Ford
Fessenden et al., The Abortion Decision Foes Elated by Ruling, NEWSDAY, July 4, 1989, at
5.; Ethan Bronner, Ruling in Missouri Case, Narrows Roe v. Wade, BOSTON GLOBE, July 4,
1989, at 1.
71. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 506 (1989).
72. Seeid. at 519.
73. In Webster, two restrictions were approved. One allowed public medical facilities
to refuse to perform abortions unless necessary to save a woman's life. See id. at 507. The
other required extensive medical tests to determine whether a fetus was viable prior to
performing an abortion after 20 weeks gestation. See id. at 519-20.
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laws. On October 5, 1989, less than two weeks before the special leg-
islative session was to begin, the Florida Supreme Court issued its
decision. In sum, the majority decided that the privacy rights provi-
sion of the Florida Constitution74 protected decisions relating to re-
production more broadly than the federal Constitution. 7' Therefore,
the court invalidated the parental consent law.
76
After many committee meetings, much marching, and media cov-
erage, the special session of the Florida Legislature convened that
October. There were numerous bills pending that would have re-
stricted abortion in various and sundry ways. 7 After two days of de-
bate, each bill was voted down in committee.18 The senators and rep-
resentatives left Tallahassee without passing a single one.79
Abortion law in Florida remained unchanged and continues to
follow Roe. 0 Abortion during the third trimester is illegal unless an
abortion is necessary to save the life or preserve the health of the
pregnant woman.8 ' Prior to the third trimester, only laws necessary
to protect the health of pregnant women and that do not interfere
with a woman's right to choose to have an abortion will be considered
valid .8 2
Since 1989, the Legislature has sought to restrict abortion rights
in various ways, but until the passage of the Woman's Right-To-
Know Act in 1997, each attempt failed to become law. 3 In addition to
the Woman's Right-To-Know Act, the 1997 Legislature sought to im-
pose several other restrictions on abortion. Although these efforts
were unsuccessful in 1997, House Bill 1701 will be carried over to the
1998 legislative session, pursuant to House Rule 96.4 Others will be
offered again by legislators.
74. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("Every natural person has the right to be let alone
and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided
herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public rec-
ords and meetings as provided by law.").
75. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1989).
76. See id. at 1194-95.
77. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1989 SPECIAL SESSION C,
HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 839, SB 3-C, SB 4-C, SB 9-C, SB 10-C, SB 11-C, SB 13-C; id.,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 840-42, HB 4-C, HB 5-C, HB 9-C, HB 10-C, HB 17-C, HB 18-
C, HB 19-C, HB 20-C, HB 21-C, HB 27-C, HB 28-C, HB 29-C, HB 30-C, HB 32-C, HB 34-C.
78. See id.
79. See Diane Rado et al., Lawmakers Reject Abortion Limits, ST. PETE. TIMES, Oct.
12, 1989, at Al.
80. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191-93 (explaining that the Florida Constitution
protects the right to privacy more broadly than the federal Constitution).
81. See FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(4) (1997).
82. SeeIn reT.W., 551 So. 2dat 1189.
83. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
84. See FLA- LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 310, HB 1701.
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IV. ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT ABORTION BY THE 1997 FLORIDA
LEGISLATURE
A. The Abortion Method Ban Bill
The "Abortion Method Ban Bill,"8 also known as the Partial-Birth
Abortion Bill, prohibited abortions where the physician "partially
vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and complet-
ing the delivery."86 The Governor vetoed the Abortion Method Ban
Bill on May 23, 1997.87 If the legislation had become law, a person
performing such an abortion would have committed a third-degree
felony and would have been subject to civil liability.88 The only excep-
tion would have been when a "partial-birth abortion" was "necessary
to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical
disorder, illness, or injury, provided that no other medical procedure
would suffice for that purpose."8 19
The medical terms for these forms of abortion are dilation and
evacuation (D&E) or dilation and intact extraction (D&X). Second
and third trimester abortions comprise only a very small percentage
of all abortions performed.90 D&E and D&X are often used in second
or third trimester abortions because they are the safest methods
available for particular patients, and they are the methods most
likely to assure women's future fertility.9' The D&X procedure is less
invasive than other abortion procedures and, therefore, poses a lower
risk to maternal health.92 The American College of Obstetricians and
85. Fla. CS for HB 1227 (1997) (substituted for Fla. CS for SB 1398 (1997)).
86. Fla. CS for HB 1227, § 1(5) (1997) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 390.011
(1995)).
87. See Veto of Fla. CS for HB 1227 (1997) (letter from Cov. Chiles to Sec'y of State
Sandra Mortham, May 23, 1997) (on file with Sec'y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee,
Fla.).
88. See Fla. CS for HB 1227, § 2(11)(a), (12) (1997) (proposed amendment to FLA.
STAT. § 390.001 (1995)).
89. Id. § 2(6)(c). This is not the first attempt by a state to restrict abortion by banning
a particular procedure. In 1976, before dilation and evacuation or dilation and intact ex-
traction methods were available, the U.S. Supreme Court found a Missouri statute prohib-
iting saline induction abortions unconstitutional. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 76-79 (1976), partially overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992). No cases have placed this precedent in question.
90. See Michelle Roman, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act and the Undue Burden It
Places on Women's Right to an Abortion: The Controversy over D&E, Dilation and Extrac-
tion, 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 381, 381 (1997).
91. See Women's Med. Profl Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1070-71 (S.D.
Ohio 1995), affd, Nos. 96-3157, 96-3159, 1997 WL 713520, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 1997).
92. See id. at 1070-71. The court found D&X was safer than fluid induction, D&E,
hysterotomy, and hysterectomy. See id. at 1070. In comparing the D&X procedure to D&E,
which was not banned, the court explained, "it does not require sharp instruments to be
inserted into the uterus with the same frequency or extent a and does not pose the same
degree of risk of uterine and cervical lacerations, due to the reduced use of forceps in the
uterus." Id.
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Gynecologists advises against the use of hysterotomy3 and hysterec-
tomy 94 "because of their prohibitively high mortality and morbid-
ity. ' 5 Fluid induction abortions, such as saline, also have several
contraindications, such as when a woman has hypertension or
asthma.96 Nevertheless, anti-abortion groups have painted D&X
abortions as especially cruel and gruesome.
9 7
1. Void-For-Vagueness
The Abortion Method Ban Bill would have prohibited most, if not
all, D&X and D&E procedures whether performed before or after vi-
ability.98 The Legislature did not define "living fetus" as opposed to
"viable fetus."99 This is clearly an effort to propagate the misconcep-
tion that, short of a stillbirth, all fetuses are capable of life outside
the womb. The fact that the language chosen by the bill's drafters is
intentionally emotionally charged, rather than technically correct, it
is also unconstitutionally vague.
The term "partial birth abortion" is ambiguous. In Planned Par-
enthood v. Woods, 00 the court enjoined a Partial Birth Abortion Act
because the court found the definition of "partial birth abortion,"
which was similar to Florida's definition, to be susceptible to various
interpretations. 1 1 The court held that the Act failed to sufficiently
define the conduct it proscribed. 0 2
Furthermore, the phrase "necessary to save the life of the mother"
is also ambiguous.10 3 In State v. Barquet,10 4 the Florida Supreme
93. Hysterotomy is basically a Caesarean section performed before term. An alterna-
tive to D&X, it is "potentially more dangerous because the uterus is thicker than it is at
the end of term, and the incision causes more bleeding and may make future pregnancies
more difficult .... Both of these methods entail the risks associated with major surgical
procedures, and are rarely used today." Id. at 1068.
94. Hysterectomy is more extreme than D&X because it requires the removal of the
uterus through major surgery and results in total inability to bear children. See id.
95. Methods of Midtrimester Abortion, ACOG TECHNICAL BULL. (American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Wash., DC), Oct. 1987, at 2.
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., Melissa Healy, Senate Upholds Veto of Late-Term Abortion Ban, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996, at A13.
98. See Fla. CS for HB 1227, § 2(6) (1997) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. §
390.001 (1995)).
99. "'Partial-birth abortion' means a termination of pregnancy in which the physician
performing the termination of pregnancy partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before
killing the fetus and completing the delivery." Id. § 1(5) (emphasis added).
100. No. 97-385 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 1997).
101. See id. at 22 (quoting the definition of "partial birth abortion" as "partially vagi-
nally delivering a fetus before killing the fetus"). The defendants admitted the term "par-
tial birth abortion" is not used in any medical text or treatise. See id.
102. See id.
103. See Fla. CS for HB 1227, § 2(6)(c) (1997) (proposed amendment to FL"A STAT. §
390.001 (1995)).
104. 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972).
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Court held that a state statute restricting abortions to instances that
are "necessary to preserve the life of [the] mother" is unconstitution-
ally vague and violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution. 0 5 The Court explained that the treating physician was at
risk of being charged with a felony if he erroneously interpreted the
language of the statute. 08 The court warned, "[t]his is precisely the
kind of situation that the void-for-vagueness doctrine is intended to
prevent."'' 7
2. Failure to Protect Maternal Health
The most obvious constitutional violation is the failure of these
bills to permit this form of abortion under circumstances where nec-
essary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman for reasons other
than the ones listed in the bill, or where necessary to preserve her
health.'10
The Florida Supreme Court has explained the importance of pro-
tecting women's health when crafting abortion laws. To be valid,
abortion restrictions must protect the women's right to privacy in the
first trimester, maternal health in the second and third trimester,
and balance between the potential life of the fetus and the health of
the pregnant woman in the third trimester.109 The state's interest in
maternal health is compelling after the first trimester, and the
state's interest in the life of the fetus is compelling upon viability,
when the fetus can potentially sustain a meaningful life outside of
the womb, generally after the second trimester."0
105. Id. at 435.
106. See id. (noting that the treating physician could have been subject to a homicide
charge if he failed to proceed with the abortion and the mother died, or up to seven years
imprisonment if the pregnant woman did not die).
107. Id.
108- See Fla. CS for HB 1227, § 2(6)(c) (1997) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. §
390.001 (1995)).
109. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193-94 (Fla. 1989).
110. See id. Abortion rights supporters generally agree that after viability there must
be a compelling reason for a woman to terminate a pregnancy and this reason must relate
to the woman's life or her continued physical well-being. The Florida Supreme Court de-
fined viability in In re T. W. as occurring "at that point in time when the fetus becomes ca-
pable of meaningful life outside the womb through standard medical measures." Id. at
1194. The court continued, 'Until this point, the fetus is a highly specialized set of cells
that is entirely dependent upon the mother for sustenance. No other member of society can
provide this nourishment. The mother and fetus are so inextricably intertwined that their
interests can be said to coincide." Id.
There is a distinction between whether a fetus can be viable outside the mother's body
and whether it can survive outside the mother's body. It is generally accepted in the medi.
cal community that less than 40% of fetuses born preterm survive at less than 23 weeks.
See Estelle B. Gauda & Christine A. Gleason, Neonatology, 275 JAMA 1823, 1824 (1996).
Most of these surviving infants suffer significant disabilities, such as mental retardation,
cerebral palsy, hearing loss, and visual impairment. See id.
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Federal courts have also applied the standard that the promotion
of maternal health is an appropriate justification for regulations in
the second trimester. In Roe, the Court recognized that the state has
"important and legitimate" interests in protecting maternal health,
and in the potential human life. During the second trimester, the
State 'may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways
that are reasonably related to maternal health."""
The Abortion Method Ban Bill failed to accommodate the need for
an abortion where the health of the mother was at stake. Thus, the
bill was unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court in Casey held that
a state must not proscribe abortion when continuing a pregnancy
would endanger the mother's health or life.1 2 Laws very similar to
the Abortion Method Ban Bill were enjoined in Arizona and Ohio and
held unconstitutional by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit and the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan for being vague and overbroad in their defini-
tions of the prohibited procedure, and for failing to protect maternal
health.13
The Committee Substitute for House Bill 1227 was passed by the
House by a vote of 84 to 31.11 It was passed by the Senate by a vote
of 28 to 9.'15 On May 23, 1997, however, Governor Lawton Chiles ve-
toed the legislation, citing its failure to provide an exception for the
health of the pregnant woman.'1 6
111. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 516 (1989) (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
112. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 880 (1992). The Court has also
struck down a statutory ban on saline amniocentesis abortions because the ban forced
women to terminate their pregnancies through procedures that were considerably more
dangerous to their health than the banned procedure. See Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 78 (1976).
113. See Planned Parenthood v. Woods, No. 97-385 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 1997); Women's
Med. Profl Corp. v. Voinovich, Nos. 96-3157, 96-3159, 1997 WL 713520, at *1 (6th Cir.
Nov. 18, 1997), affg 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1057 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Evans v. Kelly, 1997 WL
471906 at *37 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 1997).
In December 1995, a federal district court in Ohio granted an injunction against an Ohio
law that was even narrower than the Florida bill. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1057,
1092, aff'd, Nos. 96-3157, 96-3159, 1997 WL 713520, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 1997). The
Ohio bill created two separate bans. See id. at 1057. The first banned the use of the D&X
procedure in all abortions performed before viability. See id. The bill also banned all D&X
abortions performed after viability except where performed to save the life of the pregnant
woman or to avoid serious risk of substantial damage to a major bodily function. See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the injunction and found
the law unconstitutional. See Women's Med. Prof] Corp. v. Voinovich, Nos. 96-3157, 96-
3159, 1997 WL 713520, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 1997).
114. See FLA. H.R. JouR. 1095 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 28, 1997).
115. See FLA. S. JouR. 1148 (Reg. Sess. May 1, 1997).
116. See Veto of Fla. CS for HB 1227 (1997) (letter from Gov. Chiles to Sec'y of State
Sandra Mortham, May 23, 1997) (on file with Sec'y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee,
Fla.). The Florida Legislature failed to take up the vetoed legislation for an override vote
during the Special Session held November 3-7, 1997, and is now precluded from overriding
the veto. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(b).
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B. Restricting Coverage for Abortion by Private Insurance
Companies
During the 1997 Regular Session, Representative Mark Flana-
gan '1 7 and Senator John Grant '18 introduced House Bill 1701 and
Senate Bill 2304, respectively. House Bill 1701 has been carried over
to the 1998 session pursuant to House Rule 96.119 Senate Bill 2304
died in the Committee on Banking and Insurance on May 2, 1997.120
If House Bill 1701 were to pass, the legislation would usurp a doc-
tor's authority to determine when an abortion is medically necessary
under certain private health insurance plans. 2' For coverage under a
small employer standard or basic health benefit plan, the bill defines
a "termination of pregnancy" as "medically necessary" only when
"necessary to save the life of the mother."' 22 The standard and basic
health benefits plans must cover all medically necessary procedures,
including inpatient hospitalization and outpatient services for "in-
duced abortions and related procedures" unless "performed to save
the life of the mother."'12 3 This excludes coverage of any hospitaliza-
tion required to treat complications from a legal, outpatient abortion,
such as a hemorrhage, unless the medical care is necessary to save
the pregnant woman's life. 2 4
Restrictions such as these influence and interfere with the ability
of women, their families, and other loved ones in making what are
clearly very private decisions about whether and when to have chil-
dren. The fact that some may be able to afford an abortion without
insurance reimbursement does not detract from the fact that this bill
would provide a government incentive to insurance companies to
make terminating a pregnancy more costly than carrying a preg-
117. Repub., Bradenton.
118. Repub., Tampa.
119. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 310, HB 1701.
120. The Senate does not have a carry-over provision in its rules. If the Senate sponsor
wishes to pursue this issue, the bill must be refiled.
121. See Fla. HB 1701 (1997) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 627.6699 (Supp.
1996)).
The standard health benefit plan shall include:
a. Coverage for inpatient hospitalization, except coverage for inpatient hospital
care for induced abortions and related procedures is required only when such
services are medically necessary to save the life of the mother;
b. Coverage for outpatient services, but such coverage is required for induced
abortions and related procedures only when such services are necessary to save
the life of the mother;
c. Coverage for newborn children pursuant to s. 627.6575;
Id. § 1(12)(b)(4)(a)-(c). "'Medically necessary' means, for purposes of covering procedures
related to termination of pregnancy, those procedures and accompanying services neces-
sary to save the life of the mother." Id. § 1(3)(m).
122. Id. § 1(3)(m).
123. Id. § 1(12)(b)(4)(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
124. See id.
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nancy to term. The bill would impose administrative burdens on
companies wishing to include coverage for abortion in circumstances
that are not life threatening, but are medically necessary.
Twelve other states have struck similar restrictions as violative of
privacy rights and equal protection. 125 In Florida, a lawsuit on related
restrictions is pending in the Second Judicial Circuit in Leon County,
Florida, challenging the prohibition against Medicaid funding for
abortion unless it is necessary to preserve the life of the woman or if
the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest. 126 Medicaid funds all
medical services for eligible indigents that are deemed "medically
necessary" except for abortion. 27 2"Medically necessary" services have
been defined as those that are "reasonably calculated to prevent, di-
agnose, correct, cure, alleviate, or prevent the worsening of a condi-
tions" threatening life, causing pain or suffering, or resulting in ill-
ness.
128
1. Privacy Rights
The Florida Supreme Court in In re T.W. discussed the privacy in-
terests that are implicated when abortion restrictions are imposed:
The decision whether to obtain an abortion is fraught with specific
physical, psychological, and economic implications of a uniquely
personal nature for each woman. The Florida Constitution em-
bodies the principle that "[flew decisions are-more personal and in-
timate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity
and autonomy, than a woman's decision ... whether to end her
pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice freely is funda-
mental." 129
125. See Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 799 (Cal. 1981);
Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 162 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Roe v. Harris, No. 96977 (Idaho
Dist. Ct. Feb. 1, 1994); Doe v. Wright, No. 91 CH1959 (Il. Cir. Ct. Dec. 2, 1994); Moe v.
Secretary of Admin. and Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 405 (Mass. 1981); Women of Minnesota v.
Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 32 (Minn. 1995); Jeannette R. v. Ellery, No. BDV-94-811 (Mont.
Dist. Ct. May 22, 1995); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 940 (N.J. 1982); New
Mexico Right to Choose v. Danfelser, No. 95-867 (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 3, 1995); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Department of Human Resources, 663 P.2d 1247, 1261 (Or. App.
1983), affd, 687 P.2d 785 (Or. 1984); Doe v. Celani, No. S81-84CnC (Vt. Super. Ct. May 26,
1986); Women's Health Ctr. v. Penepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658, 667 (W. Va. 1993).
126. See Renee B. v. State, No. 97-3983 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. filed March 8, 1995) (trans-
ferred from Palm Beach County July 21, 1997).
127. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 59G-4.150(4)(a)(12), .-4.160(4)(a)(5), -4.230(4)(a)(11)
(1996).
128. Orlando Gen. Hosp. v. Department of HRS, 567 So. 2d 962, 963 (Fla. 5th DCA
1990).
129. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989) (quoting Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)) (emphasis added) (ci-
tations omitted).
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In addition, the Florida Supreme Court has also addressed the pri-
vacy violations that result when the state interferes with medical de-
cisions in general.
Patients do not lose their right to make decisions affecting their
lives simply by entering a health care facility.... [A] health care
provider's function is to provide medical treatment in accordance
with the patient's wishes and best interests, not as a "substitute
parent" supervening the wishes of a competent adult .... A health
care provider cannot act on behalf of the State to assert the state
interests in these circumstances.1
3 0
The Florida's Constitution's stringent protections of reproductive
choice require, at minimum, that the state remain neutral as to the
exercise of the choice. Once the Legislature takes the steps to dis-
pense funding that impacts women's constitutionally protected right
to privacy, it must do so in a non-discriminatory fashion. 1 '
2. Void-For-Vagueness
House Bill 1701 uses terms that have been consistently found un-
constitutionally vague for more than twenty-five years. There is no
substantive distinction between the bill's term "save the life" and the
term "preserve the life" of the woman or mother. 112 The phrase "nec-
essary to preserve the life of the mother" was found unconstitution-
ally vague by the Florida Supreme Court. 3' The court in Barquet re-
iterated the U.S. Supreme Court's position that the words "neces-
sary" and "preserve" are susceptible to various interpretations.
34
House Bill 1701 was scheduled to be heard twice in the House
Health Care Services Committee. 3 5 Both times the Committee de-
130. In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 823 (Fla. 1993) (holding that a patient has a con-
stitutional privacy right to refuse medical treatment).
131. See Women's Health Ctr. v. Penepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658, 666 (W. Va. 1993); Moe v.
Secretary of Admin. and Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 402 (Mass. 1981).
132. "'Medically necessary' means, for purposes of covering procedures related to the
termination of pregnancy, those procedures and accompanying services necessary to save
the life of the mother." Fla. HB 1701, § 1(3)(m) (1997) (proposed amendment to FLA STAT. §
627.6699 (Supp. 1996)) (emphasis added).
133. See State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 435 (Fla. 1972); see also supra Part IV.A.1.
134. See Barquet 262 So. 2d at 435 (noting that "necessary" is "'a word susceptible of
various meanings... [i]t may import that which is only convenient, useful, appropriate,
proper, or conducive to the end sought"') (quoting Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1388
(N.D. II. 1971)). The Supreme Court has held that a statute reading "necessary for the
preservation of the mother's life or health" instead of "necessary to preserve the life," if ap-
plicable after viability, could be constitutional and not void due to vagueness. See United
States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70-72 (1971) (recognizing that physicians must routinely de-
cide if an operation is necessary for mental or physical health whenever surgery is consid-
ered).
135. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 309- 10, HB 1701.
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ferred a vote on the bill.136 Conversely, Senate Bill 2304 was never
placed on the agenda for hearing in the Banking and Insurance
Committee.
C. Abortion Consent: The Woman's Right-To-Know Act
During the 1997 Regular Session, Representative Bob Brooks1 7
and Senator Charles Clary1 18 introduced House Bill 1205 and Senate
Bill 746, respectively. The Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 746
was replaced by the Committee Substitute for House Bill 1205 on
May 1, 1997,139 and the Florida Legislature passed the bill on the
same day.140 On June 5, 1997, the Woman's Right-To-Know Act be-
came law without the Governor's signature.14 1
The Woman's Right-To-Know Act requires a doctor performing
abortions to provide prescribed, detailed information about abortion
and its alternatives orally and in person to every patient, rather than
using his or her judgment about what degree of information is ap-
propriate for each patient and which of the office staff members
would be best suited to provide this information.1 42 The Woman's
Right-To-Know Act also requires that an abortion patient be offered
printed materials, prepared by the Florida Department of Health,
describing fetal development and providing information on assis-
tance for prenatal care, delivery, and adoption services.'4
136. See id.
137. Repub., Winter Park.
138. Repub., Destin.
139. See FLA. S. JOUR. 1270 (Reg. Sess. May 1, 1997).
140. See Act effective July 1, 1997, ch. 97-151, 1997 Fla. Laws 2501 (amending FLA.
STAT. ch. 390 (1995 & Supp. 1996)).
141. See Press Release from Exec. Office of the Gov., Gev. Lawton Chiles (May 23,
1997) (explaining the reasons for allowing the Woman's Right-To-Know Act to become law
without his signature) (on file with the Exec. Office of the Gev., Tallahassee, Fla.).
142. See FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(3)(a)-(c) (1997):
(a) Except in the case of a medical emergency, consent to a termination of preg-
nancy is voluntary and informed only if
1. The physician who is to perform the procedure, or the referring physician,
has, at a minimum, orally, in person, informed the woman of:
a. The nature and risks of undergoing or not undergoing the proposed proce-
dure that a reasonable patient would consider material to making a knowing
and willful decision of whether to terminate a pregnancy.
b. The probable gestational age of the fetus at the time the termination of
pregnancy is to be performed.
c. The medical risks to the woman and fetus of carrying the pregnancy to term.
Id.
143. See id. § 390.0111(3)(a)(2):
a. Except in the case of a medical emergency, consent to a termination of preg-
nancy is voluntary and informed only if:
2. Printed materials prepared and provided by the department have been pro-
vided to the pregnant woman, is she chooses to view these materials, including:
a. A description of the fetus.
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On July 2, 1997, the Woman's Right-to-Know Act was temporarily
enjoined by the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in Palm Beach County,
Florida. 1 The court found:
[W]omen seeking to terminate pregnancies will be subjected to in-
accurate and/or misleading information, be subjected to costly
(both in time and emotion) delays waiting for physicians to per-
sonally, orally give the information required, and suffer needless
emotional stress in receiving needless information in cases where a
medical necessity (i.e. miscarriage) has mandated the termination
of pregnancy. 145
The Woman's Right-To-Know Act imposes a substantial burden on a
woman s right to choose to have an abortion. Because the information
required to be disseminated is misleading and emotionally charged,
it could effectively dissuade some women from terminating their
pregnancies, even when carrying the pregnancies to term may effect
their health in a variety of ways, and perhaps even their lives.
The Florida Supreme Court has forbidden the state from ex-
pressing a preference for childbirth over abortion, especially in the
first trimester of pregnancy. In In re T.W., the court said, "The state
must prove that the statute furthers a compelling state interest
through the least intensive means. Under Florida law, prior to the
end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the
woman and may not be significantly restricted by the state."'146 The
state has articulated no risk to women's health requiring this pre-
scribed consent procedure or any other compelling reason to dictate
the informed consent process for abortion. Moreover, the state does
not require this provision of information in any other medical situa-
tion. Because the Woman's Right-To-Know Act applies at any point
in a pregnancy, it clearly and improperly applies to first trimester
abortions.
1. Privacy Rights and Consent
Based on the privacy rights provision of the Florida Constitution,
the Florida Supreme Court in In re T.W. decided that restrictions
and extra regulations on abortion could not be imposed without a
clear showing that they were necessary to protect the woman's
b. A list of agencies that offer alternatives to terminating the pregnancy.
c. Detailed information on the availability of medical assistance benefits for
prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care.
Id.
144. See Presidential Women's Ctr. v. State, No. 97-5796 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. July 2,
1997) (order granting preliminary injunction), appeal docketed, No. 97-2557 (Fla. 4th DCA
filed July 24, 1997).
145. Id.
146. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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health and life after the first trimester. 47 The U.S. Supreme Court
warned in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gy-
necologists'48 that "[t]he states are not free, under the guise of pro-
tecting maternal health or potential life, to intimidate women into
continuing pregnancies."" 9 The Florida Supreme Court has also held
that a health care provider should not be forced to decide between
the wishes of the state and the wishes of the patient.'50
Laws mandating biased counseling for abortion treat women
seeking abortions as though they were less thoughtful and informed
about their medical decisions than any other group of people seeking
medical care. These laws require pregnant women to be given infor-
mation to inflict not-so-subtle state-sanctioned pressure on women to
consider the interest of the fetus above their own, even when their
lives or health may be at stake. This is a blatant intrusion of gov-
ernment into the private relationship between a woman and her doc-
tor. Such an intrusion constitutes the Florida Legislature practicing
medicine without a license.
2. Equal Protection
More often than not, terminating a pregnancy is a difficult and
sad decision, but its physical ramifications are no more important
than other forms of invasive surgery. However, the Act does not
mandate that a doctor thrust detailed medical information on a man
advised to undergo prostate surgery.'5' Moreover, this legislation
does not require that information be provided to a woman about to
experience other pregnancy-related medical procedures, such as Cae-
sarean sections and prenatal care, despite the fact that Caesarean
sections and vaginal childbirth both carry higher risks to the life and
health of the woman than abortion does at any stage of the preg-
nancy. 5
Clearly, the Legislature seeks to dissuade abortion. Since such
precise information is not required to be given to women undergoing
147. See id. at 1194 (striking down a parental consent statute as a violation of article I,
section 23 of the Florida Constitution, which guarantees a broader privacy right than that
implicated in the federal Constitution).
148. 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
149. Id.
150. See In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 823 (Fla. 1993).
151. It would be absurd to pass a law requiring that informed consent for any life-
saving surgery, such as an appendectomy or melanoma removal, include information on
hospice care and the availability of burial alternatives if the patient should choose not to
undergo the procedure.
152. See Lisa M. Koonin et al., Pregnancy-Related Mortality Surveillance-United
States, 1987.1990: Results (visited Dec. 15, 1997) <http://www.amaassn.org/special/contra/
treatmnt/guide/mmwr0897/pregtpreg3.htm> (information provided by the Journal of the
American Medical Association).
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a more risky procedure or assuming the higher risks of continuing
their pregnancies,'"3 this legislation is intended to discourage women
from following through on the constitutionally protected right to
choose to terminate pregnancy. 1
4
Even if the legislation is able to meet the U.S. Supreme Court's
relaxed standards for abortion restrictions, it will not meet the more
stringent standards required by the Florida Constitution. Despite the
fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld properly crafted paren-
tal consent requirements for minors' abortions, 55 the Florida Su-
preme Court has made it clear that such laws are unconstitutional
under our state constitution unless the state has a compelling inter-
est.156
3. Void-For-Vagueness
The Woman's Right-To-Know Act violates the due process clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution
because it fails to set standards for what constitutes a pregnancy
that is life-threatening. Moreover, it contains apparently conflicting
provisions. Due process mandates that laws provide persons subject
to regulation "a reasonable opportunity to know what [conduct] is
prohibited, so that [they] may act accordingly."' 57 A statute that is
punitive in nature must be sufficiently defined "to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is for-
bidden by the statute."""8 The Woman's Right-To-Know Act contains
numerous provisions that are vague and susceptible to challenge.
In an emergency situation where it is not possible to obtain the
pregnant woman's written informed consent, the physician must still
obtain at least one corroborative medical opinion attesting to the
153. "Due to technological developments in second-trimester abortion procedures, the
point at which abortions are safer than childbirth may have been extended into the second
trimester." In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989).
154. Florida law already requires informed consent of all patients undergoing medical
procedures. See FLA. STAT. § 766.103 (1997). A pregnant woman seeking an abortion knows
if she does not have one she will almost certainly give birth to a child and that adoption,
child support, and assistance with medical care for the indigent are options.
155. See Lambert v. Wickland, 117 S. Ct. 1169, 1172 (1997) (Montana statute);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992) (Pennsylvania statute); Ohio v. Ak-
ron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (Ohio statute).
156. SeeIn reT.W., 551 So. 2d at 1195.
157. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
158. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 572 n.8 ( 1974) (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)); Kolen-
der v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) (warning that due process is violated if a stat-
ute provides no clear standard of conduct and provides enforcement authorities with the
unfettered freedom to act on nothing but their own preferences and beliefs); Aztec Motel,
Inc. v. State ex rel. Faircloth, 251 So. 2d 849, 854 (Fla. 1971) ('The underlying principle is
that no man shall be held responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably under-
stand to be proscribed.").
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medical necessity for the procedure and the fact that the woman's life
is threatened."" The only exception states, "In the event no second
physician is available for a corroborating opinion, the physician may
proceed but shall document reasons for the medical necessity in the
patient's medical records."'' 6
This provision threatens the life and health of women whose
pregnancies are life-threatening. Physicians may act conservatively
when aggressive medical measures are necessary. If a corroborating
physician cannot be found, this provision does not make it clear that
the physician can proceed without risk of sanction. It only makes it
clear that if he or she does proceed, the medical records must dis-
tinctly document the circumstances that threatened the woman's life.
Unlike other medical procedures, the Woman's Right-To-Know
Act does not allow for appropriate forms of substitute consent, such
as next-of-kin consent. 6 ' The only substitute consent the legislation
allows is for mental incompetents who have had guardians appointed
by a court.6 1
In a circumstance where a competent woman is unconscious, a
physician risks losing his license to practice medicine if he or she is
not certain that the patient has an imminent life-threatening condi-
tion caused by the pregnancy.1 i 3 This is true even if the pregnant
woman had earlier expressed her wish to undergo the procedure in
the event that circumstances arose placing her life in jeopardy, un-
less the physician had also provided the required consent informa-
tion and obtained her written consent.
The dangers of the Woman's Right-To-Know Act are not cured by
the inclusion of the provision stating that "[s]ubstantial compliance
or a reasonable belief that complying with the requirements of in-
formed consent would threaten the life or health of the patient is a
159. See FLA STAT. § 390.0111(3)(b)-(c) (1997).
(b) In the event a medical emergency exists and a physician cannot comply
with the requirements for informed consent, a physician may terminate a preg-
nancy if he or she has obtained at least one corroborative medical opinion at-
testing to the medical necessity for emergency medical procedures and to the
fact that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty the continuation of the
pregnancy would threaten the life of the pregnant woman. In the event no sec-
ond physician is available for a corroborating opinion, the physician may pro-
ceed but shall document reasons for the medical necessity in the patient's rec-
ords.
(c) Violation of this subsection by a physician constitutes grounds for discipli-
nary action under § 458.331 or § 459.015. Substantial compliance or reasonable
belief that complying with the requirements of informed consent would
threaten the life or health of the patient is a defense to any action brought un-
der this paragraph.
Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. § 766.103.
162. See id. § 390.0111(3).
163. See id. § 390.0111(3)(c).
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defense to any action brought under this paragraph. 16 4 The bottom
line is that states may not constitutionally impose restrictions on
abortion if it is necessary to preserve the woman's life or health at
any time during a pregnancy. 65 The substantial compliance or rea-
sonable belief provision still requires an interpretation of whether
the physician acted appropriately when not seeking informed con-
sent. Knowing that a decision to proceed without informed consent
may be subject to "second guessing," a physician may not proceed in
a manner that is in the woman's best interest for fear of civil or
criminal prosecution.
A statute may also be vague if it is subject to arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement because it fails to provide explicit standards
for those applying the law. As the Court explained in Grayned v. City
of Rockford,166 a law that does not provide clear standards for those
who must apply it is void-for-vagueness because it "impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dan-
gers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."'167
The Woman's Right-To-Know Act expressly states that the physi-
cian must inform the woman of the "medical risks to the woman and
fetus" of carrying the pregnancy to term. 16 8 However, the Act also re-
quires the physician to inform the woman of the "nature and risks of
undergoing or not undergoing the proposed procedure," and does not
limit itself to medical risks. 69 The principle of statutory construction
that "express mention is implied exclusion"'70 indicates that the Act
requires that information concerning only the medical risks related
to carrying a pregnancy to term be provided, but that information
concerning all the risks related to abortion be provided. 7' However,
the plain meaning of the latter provision dictates that this informa-
tion be broader than just the medical risks, and the legislative his-
tory of the Act bears this out. 72 Thus, the Act is subject to a reason-
able interpretation that the information provided must include, but
is not limited to, financial risks, social risks, emotional risks, and
educational risks. All of these areas of a woman's life are undeniably
164. Id.
165. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
166. 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
167. Id. at 108-09 (footnote omitted).
168. FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(3)(a)(1)(c) (1997).
169. Id. § 390.O111(3)(a)(1)(a).
170. Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976) (construing a restaurant licensing
statute); see also Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1952) (construing a stat-
ute establishing time bars for worker's compensation); Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v.
Cauley, 651 So. 2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (construing a statute governing coop-
erative leaseholds).
171. See FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(3)(a)(1)(c) (1997).
172. See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1086, 1087 (Reg. Session Apr. 28,1997).
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and directly affected by her decision of whether and when to have a
child.
The Act provides no guidance on which of a multitude of risks of
undergoing or not undergoing the proposed procedure must be dis-
cussed and which might be skipped to avoid the statutory penalties.
Thus, it is impermissibly vague. It requires doctors to become profi-
cient in fields for which they are not professionally trained as spe-
cialists, such as neonatology, genetics, pathology of fetal abnormal-
ity, theology, philosophy, religion, and bioethics.
4. First Amendment Violations
The Woman's Right-To-Know Act requires the attending physi-
cian to recite the state-prescribed information and offer state-
authorized materials to the patient.7 3 Because these requirements
may require physicians to act against their best medical judgment
and to be couriers of the state's ideological message on abortion, the
Act violates a physician's right to free speech as guaranteed by the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.1 7 4
The Act requires a physician to inform the woman about certain
aspects of the nature of abortion and childbirth about which there is
no consensus and for which a physician may not be trained. The Act
requires a doctor to guess as to exactly what information is required
to be provided to the patient and, if he or she speculates incorrectly,
to be subject to disciplinary action.1 5 This will have a chilling effect
upon speech, deny women their constitutional rights, and deny phy-
sicians the right to speak and act as their professional training and
consciences dictate.
V. CONCLUSION
No consensus exists in our society regarding the non-medical na-
ture of abortion. Some see it as the cessation of a potential human
life, but not an actual human life. Some see it as murder. Some see it
as immoral. The Florida Supreme Court has described abortion as a
most basic fundamental constitutional privacy right that a person
may, up to the point of viability, exercise without governmental in-
trusion under Florida law.
The legislation's requirement that physicians inform women about
the non-medical nature of continuing pregnancies to term presents
173. See FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(3) (1997).
174. See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943) (holding that the
First Amendment right to free speech includes the right to refrain from speaking). The
right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the
broader concept of "individual freedom of mind." See id. at 637.
175. See FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(3)(c) (1997).
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similar difficulties. For some, the nature of childbirth represents a
contribution to overpopulation, to others the most glorious and re-
markable event in a person's life, to others a blessed occurrence and
a gift from the Almighty, to others a shameful punishment for sin or
the worst crisis they have ever faced, to others an opportunity to en-
large a family, and for others the potential destruction of the family
unit. In the case of a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest, the
stress and emotional difficulty of discussing the nature of abortion or
childbirth are greatly compounded.
Nonetheless, the Woman's Right-To-Know Act requires physicians
to provide information that is "material" to a woman's decision
whether or not to undergo a termination of pregnancy, no matter
what her particular circumstance might entail. There are no guide-
lines, standards, or definitions to advise the physician in under-
standing how much of the pregnant woman's medical or other per-
sonal history must be known to assure the physician's compliance.
The physician could be required to be aware of all factors that
might possibly cause any complications or bad outcomes during
stages of the pregnancy far more advanced than the stage at which
the abortion would be performed. Physicians could also be required
to be aware of exceedingly rare or statistically insignificant possibili-
ties of complications depending on the physical condition of that par-
ticular patient. Physicians could also be required to be up-to-the-
minute on statistical information if or when new medical develop-
ments begin to decrease or increase risks. The Act fails to specify
with clarity the physician's responsibility concerning the information
he or she is required to provide if the procedure or method being used
is relatively new and if the degree of risk has changed or is not sta-
tistically known.
The statistics for Florida show that 80,040 abortions were induced
in 1996.176 Of these abortions less than one percent, or fewer than
twelve, were performed after viability. Women still die in childbirth
and from pregnancies that go wrong. Sometimes this is unexpected.
At other times, however, women know how high the risk is and take
it anyway.
The Woman's Right-To-Know Act did not change the preferential
consideration given to a woman's life and health when either of these
is in conflict with the life and health of her fetus. The Florida statute
says:
If a termination of pregnancy is performed during viability, no
person who performs or induces the termination of pregnancy shall
fail to use that degree of professional skill, care, and diligence to
176. See Fla. S. Comm. on Health Care, CS for SB 1398 (1997) Staff Analysis 1 (Apr.
18, 1997) (on file with comm.).
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preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person would
be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of
any fetus intended to be born and not aborted .... Notwithstand-
ing the provisions of this subsection, the woman's life and health
shall constitute an overriding and superior consideration to the
concern for the life and health of the fetus when such concerns are
in conflict.177
This has been the law in Florida for nearly twenty years' 7 and
continues to be the law. It constitutes an appropriate recognition
that the protection of an existing human should take precedence over
the protection of a fetus, whether viable or unviable. This is a good
balance and should not be changed.
177. FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(4) (1997) (emphasis added).
178. See Act effective July 1, 1979, ch. 79-302, § 1, 1979 Fla. Laws 1596, 1615 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 458.505(5) (1979)).
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